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Abstract  
This article examines how poor people negotiate obligations placed on them by social welfare 
initiatives. More specifically, it considers Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs), and 
the ways beneficiaries harness program conditionalities to make demands on authorities, in 
some cases even enacting subtle forms of resistance to state governance. Drawing from 
Michel de Certeau, it argues that while CCT conditionalities function as strategies of state 
development, they are not always/already under exclusive state control. Marginalized groups 
like CCT recipients can tactically harness these conditionalities. Through such tactics, poor 
people make demands on the state and deflect program obligations, but in calculated ways 
that avoid exposing them to greater vulnerability. Drawing from empirical data collected as 
part of a case study in rural northeastern Brazil, this article contributes to existent bodies of 
literature on CCTs, governance, and critical development studies in the twenty-first century. 
  












1  Waiting on the state 
 Viçosa do Ceará is a small town in northeastern Brazil. It is located on the western 
edge of the state of Ceará near to the border with Piauí (see Fig. 1). According to the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Viçosa has a population of roughly 
20,000 inhabitants. It lies in the center of its surrounding municipality, and is a hub for local 
political and economic activity. The municipality shares the same name as the town, and has 
a total population – again, according to the IBGE – of nearly 60,000 people. Viçosa the 
municipality is overwhelmingly rural, making Viçosa the town the only urban area in a rather 
large municipal space of 1,312 km2. During the day the town comes alive, swelling with 
visitors from the surrounding agricultural countryside, and in the evening it empties out, 
reduced to only the residents who permanently live there.  
(Figure 1 about here.) 
 Not surprisingly, there are specific locations in town where activity swarms: the 
public market, the main hospital, and the municipal offices headquarters, to name a few. Add 
to this now the local branch office of the Caixa Econômica Federal (Brazil’s Federal Savings 
Bank), which very recently has become another of Viçosa’s busiest locations. At least, that is, 
on the last ten days of every month. On these days, large lines extend out the front door and 
far down the street. The people in line wait to receive their monthly benefit from Brazil’s 
Programa Bolsa Família (PBF), a federal welfare program launched in 2003 to alleviate 
extreme poverty and hunger. Program benefits are distributed via the Federal Savings Bank 
on the last ten days of each month, when recipients must present themselves to local bank 
officials to receive payment. On these days, beginning early in the morning and extending 
through to the afternoon, large crowds gather at the door of Viçosa’s Federal Savings Bank 
branch office (see Fig. 2).   
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 The reasons for such long lines are twofold. The first is that the municipality of 
Viçosa is a poor one, and more than 95 percent of residents receive PBF benefits.i Recipient 
claims are staggered across the final ten days of each month to prevent overcrowding, 
meaning that each individual recipient must report to bank officials on their designated day to 
receive payment. With thousands of people coming to the bank on each of these days, long 
lines are not surprising. It is the same in hundreds (if not thousands) of other poor 
municipalities throughout Brazil. The second reason, however, is more complicated, and 
stems in part from Brazil’s penchant for bureaucratic protocol and (over)administration. 
Rather than automatically transferring program benefits to receipt families, face-to-face 
contact must be made each month, specific routines are performed, state oversight 
established, interactions documented, forms stamped, etc. These sorts of practices have 
existed in Brazil since colonial times (Faoro, 1975). Yet as researchers have observed 
elsewhere (Ballard, 2013; Standing, 2011), such regulations are by no means unique to 
Brazil: they are common to Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) like PBF, where 
social welfare for the poor comes with strings attached. On the one hand comes desperately 
needed income assistance, while on the other comes a host of obligations that must be 
fulfilled by program recipients (Cookson, 2016; Sener, 2015). Sam Hickey notes that 
although poverty reduction schemes like CCTs are crucial to reducing hunger, they also seek 
to induce specific and desired behaviors within poor populations through program 
conditionalities (2010). 
(Figure 2 about here.) 
 The purpose of this article is to critically interrogate how poor people engage the 
conditionalities of CCT programs. More specifically, I consider the ways PBF recipients 
make demands on the state through program conditionalities, and in some cases even enact 
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subtle forms of resistance to state governance. Rather than expanding on arguments that CCT 
conditionalities operate as technologies of governmentality (Hossain, 2010; Luccisano, 
2006), or instead that CCTs produce ‘more’ or ‘less’ intense forms of citizenship (Hunter and 
Sugiyama, 2014; Pereira, 2015; Rego and Pinzani, 2013), my goal in this article is to explore 
how CCT recipients make use of program conditionalties to put pressure on the state. 
Drawing from Michel de Certeau (1984), I suggest that while CCT conditionalities function 
as strategies for state development initiatives, they are not always/already under exclusive 
state control. Marginalized groups like CCT recipients can harness them tactically. Through 
such tactics, poor people make demands on the state and deflect program obligations, but in 
calculated ways that avoid exposing themselves to greater vulnerability. Drawing from 
empirical data collected as part of a case study, this article pushes existent bodies of literature 
on CCTs, governance, and critical development studies in the twenty-first century (c.f., 
Garmany, 2016; Gupta, 2012; Li, 2007; Scott, 2009).    
 Findings in this article come from field research conducted in northeast Brazil; 
specifically from the municipality of Viçosa do Ceará, and more generally from other 
neighboring municipalities. This region is decidedly rural, providing interesting points of 
contrast to existing research on CCT programs (Lo Vuolo, 2013; Sany and Daudelin, 2013; 
Sugiyama, 2013) as well as studies drawing on the work of de Certeau (Lee, 2006; Secor, 
2004). I begin in the next section by unpacking debates over CCT programs and their 
conditionalities, and ground these arguments in the context of PBF and my case study from 
northeast Brazil. I then move on to show how PBF conditionalities are engaged tactically by 
poor Brazilians, highlighting the ways beneficiaries dodge burdensome protocol and make 
demands on the state through the very discourses of the program itself (e.g., responsibility, 
compliance, independence). By reflecting on these processes, my goal in this article is to 
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push existing accounts regarding the effects of CCT programs, and to offer new analytical 
traction to ongoing debates in political, development, and critical human geography.       
2  Debating Conditional Cash Transfers 
 By most accounts, Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) have existed for more 
than 20 years (Ballard, 2013; Pereira, 2015; Seekings, 2012). They require beneficiary 
families to fulfill certain obligations – e.g., registration and monitoring, healthcare checkups, 
child education – making them social welfare programs with conditionalities. Should 
recipient families fail to meet these conditionalities, they could be cut off from income 
assistance used to buy basic foodstuffs. Draconian as such regulations appear to some (Saad-
Filho, 2015; Standing, 2011), today CCTs are widely credited with reducing hunger in 
countries of the Global South and developing “human capital” by targeting child 
development and education (Fizbein and Schady, 2009). Now at work in dozens of countries 
worldwide, CCTs are especially popular in Latin America, where at least 18 different 
countries employ CCT programs to combat poverty and chronic hunger (Lavinas, 2013). 
 The world’s largest CCT program is Brazil’s Programa Bolsa Família (PBF), with 
almost 14 million registered families and a total recipient base of approximately 50 million 
people (Campello and Neri, 2014). Since PBF was launched by the Workers’ Party in 2003 it 
has combined with other federal social assistance policies (many related to housing), along 
with annual incremental adjustments to the minimum wage, to greatly alter Brazil’s political 
and economic landscape (Saad-Filho, 2015). It should be noted that in addition to the 
questions of state governance addressed in this article, elected officials and their political 
campaigns are also important for shaping PBF. This is to say that the goals and effects of 
CCTs are explained by more than just state power and governmentality: they represent in 
many instances the efforts of politicians concerned with winning elections, as well as 
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competition among political parties and attempts to appeal to voters (Coêlho, 2012; Pereira, 
2015).   
With respect to effectiveness, policy experts mostly agree that PBF has been 
implemented successfully (Campello and Neri, 2014; Montero, 2014), and that the program is 
remarkably well managed and cost effective (Pereira, 2015). Families are deemed eligible for 
PBF if their per capita monthly household income is less than R$150 ($45-55 dollars), and 
the amount they receive depends on the number of dependents living at home relative to total 
household income. To receive the benefit, families must adhere to the following 
conditionalities: registration with municipal authorities; verification and maintenance of 
municipal domicile; providing household demographic information; ensuring their children 
maintain regular attendance at school (85 percent of school days for children 6-15; 75 percent 
for children 16-17); having their children inoculated against infectious disease; having their 
children’s growth and development monitored by state healthcare professionals; and pregnant 
women must attend pre-natal healthcare checkups. Most development experts look favorably 
on PBF, and the program is often used as a model for CCTs elsewhere (Pereira, 2015).   
 Where researchers tend to criticize PBF and other CCTs, however, lies in the 
conditional obligations that recipients must fulfill. Rather than just serving to eradicate 
hunger and provide child welfare, scholars contend that CCTs are also designed to re-
engineer underperforming sectors of society (Corboz, 2013; Ferguson, 2010; Meltzer, 2013; 
Peck and Theodore, 2012, 2015). Simply put, the poor are meant to change their habits, 
behaviors, and practices by adhering to CCT conditionalities (Hossain, 2010). Reducing 
hunger is a high priority, but connected to this are biopolitical objectives: like other 
development programs, CCTs are intended to improve the productive capacities of the 
population, creating docile, more pliable citizen subjects out of the poor (Garmany, 2016). 
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The next section of this article addresses this issue more directly, focusing on CCT 
conditionalities and their connections to contemporary governance. While academic debates 
often investigate the biopolitical and neoliberal underpinnings of CCT programs (Corboz, 
2013; Meltzer, 2013; Sener, 2015), in this article I take a different approach. By critically 
unpacking the everyday interactions between PBF beneficiaries and state actors, I show how 
poor people find opportunities in PBF conditionalities to tactically subvert obligations placed 
on them by the state, and also to make demands on the state for improved services.  
 Empirical research for this article was conducted during two rounds of fieldwork 
between 2013-2014. Both trips to the field lasted for two months, and in 2014 I returned to 
many of the same towns and settlements I visited in 2013. Though data were collected in 
several municipalities, this article draws primarily from findings in the municipality of 
Viçosa do Ceará. Data from this municipality reflect a balance of state and non-state voices, 
as well as several hours of participant observation split between (and sometimes in the 
presence of both) PBF administrators and PBF recipients. Moreover, focusing upon a single 
municipality helps to make comparisons of the data more consistent (e.g., when considering, 
for example, citizen engagements with municipal authorities), as well as narrowing the 
analysis to avoid broader issues related to an ongoing border dispute between the states of 
Ceará and Piauí (see Fig. 1 and also Garmany, 2016).  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 PBF recipients (with 11 follow up 
interviews), including several ‘informal’ interviews conducted as part of participatory 
observation. These interviews queried how PBF recipients experienced state institutions and 
state actors, their daily challenges and concerns, and their encounters with the state more 
generally (e.g., public healthcare facilities, public schools, PBF registration and collection, 
municipal infrastructure). Even more important were several days spent in the company of 
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these respondents and their families, conducting participant observation to understand the 
ways they made due on a daily basis. With state actors, 18 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted (with 8 follow up interviews), along with several informal interviews collected 
during participant observation within municipal institutions. These interviews brought to light 
the experiences of state actors working in PBF administration, showing how and in what 
ways their perspectives (mis)matched with PBF recipients. Part and parcel with these 
interviews were several hours of participant observation in municipal institutions – what 
Andolina et al. call “inter-institutional ethnography” (2009, page 247) – in order to see 
firsthand how they interacted with local residents and how decisions were made. These data 
were fleshed out with document analysis and technical reports, in addition to extensive travel 
within the region to visually verify claims made by interview respondents.  
3  The strategies and the tactics 
 Though CCT programs may be a relatively new development strategy, there already 
exists a robust academic literature on their aims and effects (Ballard, 2013; Fiszbein and 
Shady, 2009; Peck and Theodore, 2012, 2015). Critical scholars have considered their 
efficacy in terms of poverty reduction (Handa and Davis, 2006; Soares et al., 2010), as well 
as their broader political economic and governance ramifications (Fenwick, 2009; Seekings, 
2012). While some researchers see potential in CCTs for increasing access to citizenship 
rights (Hall, 2013; Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014; Sany and Daudelin, 2013), others are more 
critical, suggesting that CCTs offer only the barest financial assistance and can work in subtle 
ways to further marginalize poor people (Saad-Filho, 2015; Standing, 2011).  
Of particular scrutiny have been questions of women’s empowerment (Corboz, 2013; 
Molyneux, 2007; Molyneux and Thompson, 2011) and education and child welfare (Hanlon 
et al., 2010; Hossain, 2010). While they provide crucial assistance to poor families, programs 
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like PBF also aim to produce an ideal-type neoliberal citizen who is fiscally responsible, 
economically savvy, and capable of looking after their own welfare (c.f., Ferguson, 2010). 
Writes Judy Meltzer, CCTs are connected to neoliberal ideologies of “good citizenship,” 
whereby recipients are meant to learn appropriate financial risk management strategies (2013, 
page 646).  
These critiques connect to broader debates concerning the ways governmentality 
underlies development initiatives (Gupta, 2012; Li, 2007), and more specifically the 
biopolitical implications of CCT conditionalities (Hickey, 2010; Meltzer, 2013; Sener, 2015). 
By requiring beneficiaries to comply with conditional obligations that discipline their daily 
practice, administer their spatialities (demographic capture, municipal registration, monthly 
reporting and attendance), and acquiesce to the state’s medical gaze and education objectives, 
critical researchers argue that CCTs seek a host of governmentality objectives intended to 
cultivate more productive, complicit, and reliably governable populations (Hossain, 2010; 
Luccisano, 2006). This is not to say that such intentions and/or their effects are necessarily 
‘bad’ or ‘good’: to do so would be to misunderstand the ways governmentality and 
neoliberalism operate, and to overlook their diverse outcomes (Ferguson, 2015). Instead, 
what draws scholarly attention are the ways governmentality and neoliberal objectives built 
into development initiatives remain incomplete, and the ways poor people benefit from, 
resist, and rearticulate the state’s disciplinary objectives (Ferguson, 2010; Li, 2007). Writes 
Akhil Gupta, “one has to remember how [governmentality] is itself a conjuntural and crisis-
ridden enterprise, how it engenders its own modes of resistance, and makes, meets, molds, or 
is contested by new subjects” (2012, page 239). Such perspective is especially useful for 
considering CCTs: while reasons for their failure to produce intended neoliberal governance 
outcomes have been explored (Garmany, 2016), still missing are critical investigations of the 
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ways beneficiaries engage program conditionalities. More directly, and following Gupta, how 
might CCTs produce new modes of resistance, and how are conditionalities met and 
contested by recipient populations?   
 Helpful here is the work of geographer Anna Secor (2004, 2007), who explores the 
ways migrant Kurdish women in Istanbul negotiate everyday practices, tropes, and discourses 
of Turkish citizenship. For Secor, citizenship exemplifies Michel de Certeau’s notion of 
“strategies”: hegemonic practices and discourses deployed by those seeking to control and 
dominate space and social relations (de Certeau, 1984). As a strategy, citizenship works to 
differentiate insiders from outsiders, establishing criteria that demarcate the ‘real’ citizens in 
any given society. It limits access to certain spaces and establishes hegemonic parameters for 
spatial mobility. Without access to such strategies, Kurdish migrants in Istanbul rely on their 
anonymity in public space to “pass” as Turkish (Secor, 2004, page 360). For de Certeau, 
these practices represent “tactics”: “a guileful ruse” adopted by the subjugated who “must 
accept the chance offerings of the moment” (1984, page 37). Tactics are acts of resistance, 
but disguised and ambiguous in their challenge to power. Though citizenship may work as a 
strategy to discipline and code space in Istanbul through various signs, symbols, and customs, 
the tactics of Kurdish migrants serve to subvert these hegemonic practices, allowing them to 
exist in their anonymity and guile.  
 So how is Secor’s work useful for understanding PBF in northeast Brazil? On the one 
hand, PBF conditionalities operate in much the same way as Turkish citizenship: they are 
strategies seeking to exert greater control over space, practice, and social relations (c.f., 
Hossain, 2010; Meltzer, 2013; Peck and Theodore, 2015). Like citizenship, conditionalities 
attempt to implement “a set of hegemonic practices and discourses, [that] assembles and 
naturalizes the subject positions of [people], situating them within a grid of power relations 
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across state and society” (Secor, 2004, page 359). These are the governmentality objectives 
of CCTs, and they are produced through strategies like program conditionalities. And on the 
other hand, Secor’s work is also useful in how it harnesses Michel de Certeau’s notion of 
“making do” (1984). With little recourse against state negligence and abuse of power, and a 
national discourse that expects gratitude for their everyday existence, PBF recipients in Brazil 
– like Kurdish migrants in Istanbul – must make do on a daily basis. Yet how exactly do CCT 
beneficiaries make do, and what are their tactics? Going further, how do they engage state 
development strategies and the governmentality objectives of CCT conditionalities?  
 In the remaining sections of this article I work to provide answers to these questions. 
By reflecting frequently on contributions from de Certeau, Secor, Gupta, and others, I show 
how PBF beneficiaries negotiate program conditionalities through disguised and very 
calculated acts of resistance. Using tactics, PBF beneficiaries push back against obligations 
laid upon them by the state, and even make use of conditionalities to voice demands for 
improved public services. In addition to shedding much needed light on the tactics of CCT 
recipients, this article also explores important spatial differences between urban and rural 
contexts (Cookson, 2016; Parsons, 2015). To better understand how CCT conditionalities 
operate on the ground  – particularly for those who live outside of major urban areas – more 
focus is needed on the ways poor people make do, balancing daily household needs with the 
requirements, protocol, and obligations of the state. 
4  Programa Bolsa Família in rural northeastern Brazil 
Seu Pedro and his family live in the miniscule community of Horizonte on the 
municipal outskirts of Viçosa do Ceará. Like other families in the area, they are subsistence 
agriculturalists who, over time, have negotiated a mostly autonomous relationship from local 
latifúndiarios (large estate owners). In the past these latifúndiarios held total sway over the 
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region, but in recent decades their ‘governing work’ (e.g., patronage) has shifted mostly to 
the state. This is not to say that landed elites are no longer powerful in northeast Brazil, but 
that the governance of state actors has in recent years begun to replace the government of 
latifúndiarios. Reasons for this change are myriad, and connect on several levels to the 
objectives of state actors themselves. On the one hand is the issue of winning votes, which 
was hardly a factor until Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985. And on the other hand are 
financial incentives for municipal officials to expand services like PBF to poor residents, an 
issue explored later in this paper and in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Campello and Neri, 
2014; Garmany, 2016; Pereira, 2015).    
The land around Horizonte is poor, like the inhabitants, and life in the region has long 
been precarious. Until the advent of PBF, rates of malnutrition and infant mortality were 
high, and even today most adults are functionally illiterate and show the corporeal effects of 
long-term poverty (stunted growth, premature aging, unaddressed medical ailments). The 
children look like a new race of people altogether, each one taller, healthier, and better 
nourished than their parents. PBF alone is not responsible for this change – Brazil’s surging 
agricultural export market and federal subsidies for small farmers also play a role – but the 
transformative effects of PBF should not be underestimated. Life for the youngest generation 
in Horizonte offers a wealth of new opportunities, and for Seu Pedro, the quasi-patriarch of 
the community, these offerings are not to be wasted.      
According to municipal administrators, Seu Pedro visits office headquarters in Viçosa 
at least once a month to lobby for infrastructural development in and around Horizonte. Seu 
Pedro confirms, insisting that in fact “every week!” he appears at their door. When I first met 
him in 2013 he was championing roadways and transportation, insisting the dirt roads of the 
countryside were insufficient and dangerous for the population. Indeed, few roads in the 
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municipality of Viçosa were paved, and fast growing numbers of auto-vehicles (mostly 
motorcycles and scooters) are placing increased pressure on municipal planners. Beginning in 
2012, Seu Pedro began to ask for the (almost) unthinkable: to pave the dirt roadways of the 
countryside so that one could travel from the city of Viçosa, roughly 45 kilometers from 
Horizonte, all the way to Seu Pedro’s house without ever leaving a paved roadway. When 
municipal planners first recounted this story to me in 2013, one joked that the project was 
absurd, as a donkey (i.e, Seu Pedro’s most common form of transportation) hardly needs a 
paved road to walk on.  
Returning in 2014, however, I found road crews at work all over the municipality. Not 
every dirt road in Viçosa was slated for paving, but many of them were, including several in 
the area of Horizonte. Seu Pedro looked vindicated, smiling in his triumph. He could see my 
surprise, and explained at length his role in the process: 
They [municipal authorities] complain when the children miss school, but 
what can we do? We don’t want them to miss school, but when it rains, how 
are we supposed to take them to school? So Jeff, you know me; we’re decent 
people and we want to educate our children. We try everyday to make sure 
they go to school and study, we have this responsibility. But if the roads won’t 
allow it, what can we do? We look irresponsible! But who’s responsible for 
the roads? We’re responsible for our children, but we can’t take them to 
school if the Prefeitura [City Hall] won’t take care of the roads. That’s their 
responsibility! 
 
Seu Pedro said that for years he had been complaining about school transportation 
difficulties, and that finally municipal authorities could no longer ignore it. That, and election 
promises made to him and other rural families in 2013, had finally brought action. “If they 
never do their job,” he continued, “people won’t vote for them. So that’s what happened: 
[smiling] they knew the people were watching and they had to be responsible. We didn’t say 
it to them, we never insisted, but they knew. They had to do their job.” 
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 Interviews with municipal authorities, not surprisingly, yielded a different account of 
events. Insisting that forward-thinking fiscal management provided surplus revenues, 
municipal planners said that it was always their goal to pave rural roadways, but that until 
2014 it was unfeasible. Noting (correctly) that other municipalities in the region lagged far 
behind in such efforts, authorities in Viçosa were also quick to point out that political 
corruption was an issue in neighboring areas – and not in Viçosa – and that this helped to 
explain their municipality’s success. What both rural residents and municipal planners failed 
to mention, however, is the very likely role of business interests in these processes. 
Construction firms are major financiers of Brazilian political campaigns (Power and Taylor, 
2011), counting on lucrative contracts if/when their candidate is (re)elected. Thus it should 
come as no surprise that major infrastructural works were underway in 2014, a post-election 
year in Viçosa. Seu Pedro was likely right that campaign promises were behind municipal 
initiatives to pave rural roadways, but whether they were promises to voters or to campaign 
donors is another matter altogether.    
 What this example highlights, however, are some of the changes brought on by PBF, 
both in terms of rural and urban development as well as the ways poor people are engaging 
the state and PBF conditionalities. In the first instance, municipalities like Viçosa are highly 
dependent on PBF for revenue: recipients rely on the money for household needs, and central 
cities like Viçosa gain tremendously from PBF expenditures at local stores. The multiplier 
effects of CCTs are especially pronounced in rural areas (Campello and Neri, 2014), as 
recipients come to town, collect their benefits, and spend their income locally. In the case of 
PBF, purchases can only be made using an electromagnetic card (like a debit card), meaning 
that PBF money stays within the formal economy and can only be spent at stores with PBF 
card-scanning capabilities. Additionally, should recipient families fail to meet conditional 
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obligations (e.g. school attendance) and find themselves cut off from PBF benefits, the results 
are far reaching: most affected, of course, is the individual family, but central cities like 
Viçosa also lose out on vital revenue streams. As such, making sure recipient families can 
fulfill CCT conditionalities – by paving roads and even providing transportation options – is 
important to a host of different actors in rural municipalities. 
These sorts of broader effects provide CCT recipients a certain leverage in their 
interactions with state actors. Time and again during interviews with PBF recipients in 
Viçosa, respondents remarked upon the ways business and political elites profited from PBF. 
People like Seu Pedro are fully aware how important PBF is to Viçosa and its municipal 
authorities, and it emboldens them in their engagements with program conditionalities. Seu 
Pedro’s lobbying for better roadways on account of meeting PBF education requirements is 
just one example, as are instances where mothers protest the public healthcare services 
provided them and their infant children, or entire communities raise awareness for the poor 
state of public schools. PBF recipients in Viçosa, rather than being merely grateful for these 
services, realize that others, much wealthier than they, profit considerably from PBF. Rather 
than directly confronting political leaders with such observations, however – attempting to 
coerce or blackmail them, as it were – they make their demands tactically, noting the 
difficulties they face in meeting PBF conditionalities. Seu Pedro realizes the subtext of his 
complaints to municipal leaders (“I’m being responsible in my PBF duties, now you do the 
same!”), but outwardly, his language is not a direct challenge to the state (“It’s so hard to 
keep up with school attendance with these dirt roads”). Calculated in their effects, such 
tactics, instead of confronting state actors head on with rights-based discourses, allow for 
long-rooted clientelist relations to continue operating, at least on the surface.    
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In addition to paved roadways, other recent improvements included transportation to 
and from schools (i.e., school buses) and education resources in Viçosa (e.g., building 
infrastructure, learning materials, qualified teachers). When asked, rural residents remarked 
upon their own roles in these processes, noting how change had come after years of 
complaints to municipal leaders. Said Célia,ii a grandmother of 17 children: 
I know it’s important that children go to school, but how is my husband 
supposed to take them all? When I was young we hardly ever went because it 
was too difficult, we usually walked. But now, as you said, the children all go 
to school. They have to go because of this Bolsa Família. But how are we 
supposed to take them? This is what I said several times to Paulinho [a local 
municipal authority]: ok, fine, now our children have to be in school, but who 
will take them? How will they get there? And he understood. He understood. 
And now the school bus comes everyday and takes all the children to school. 
Every single day.  
 
Célia’s account helps to illustrate how PBF recipients draw on program conditionalities to 
tactically make demands on state actors. Rather than saying ‘we deserve better!’ – which 
Célia was certainly within her rights to do – her complaints appealed to meeting the demands 
of PBF child education requirements. So clever were Célia’s tactics with Paulinho, the 
municipal leader she complained to, that he never appeared to have felt directly confronted 
by her. When I spoke to him later, he even suggested that the school bus idea had been his 
own. Whether he truly believed this or was trying to take credit for a good idea, he 
nevertheless expressed his rationale in the same register as Célia: the school buses had been 
implemented, he said, because of the difficulties faced by rural residents and their needs to 
meet PBF requirements. Not only had Célia helped to influence his thinking; Paulinho even 
sounded like Célia when explaining his reasons.   
 Combined with PBF school attendance requirements are also a host of healthcare 
conditionalities. Children must complete several vaccinations by the age of 7, state healthcare 
professionals monitor child growth and development, and pregnant women must receive pre-
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natal care and guidance. In Viçosa, PBF recipients rarely complained about the 
implementation of these conditionalities, but rather the difficulties of meeting them. Many 
lamented a lack of resources and healthcare personnel at state health clinics. Complained 
Juliana, a resident of Horizonte and mother of two young children, “the [health] clinic is open 
only three days per week and only in the mornings. If you arrive after 9 a.m. there’ll be a long 
line and you won’t be attended to.” Other residents made similar complaints, noting that 
clinics in the area often lacked medical supplies and trained staff. Such problems were even 
worse in some neighboring municipalities, where health clinics opened only once or twice a 
week and were severely under-resourced. Beyond serious issues of public healthcare neglect, 
such problems also highlight additional strains placed on state infrastructure by CCTs: more 
staff and services are needed to fulfill PBF conditionalities (e.g., monitoring child growth and 
development), and especially in poor, rural areas where a majority of the population is 
enrolled on the program.    
 So severe are the needs for qualified medical staff in rural northeastern Brazil that in 
2013 the federal government launched the ‘More Doctors Program’ (Programa Mais 
Médicos). Combined with university training to increase numbers of Brazilian physicians and 
medical professionals, the program also seeks to employ several thousand foreign doctors – 
most notably from Cuba – to address immediate healthcare needs (Santos et al., 2015). When 
I returned to Viçosa in 2014 several Cuban doctors were already working in the region, and 
while none were yet established directly in Viçosa, since then (at the time of writing) four 
have started work in the municipality, including one at the clinic near Horizonte. To argue 
that the More Doctors Program is a direct result of PBF beneficiary tactics would of course 
be too much, but neither should the efforts of poor people be overlooked. Much like 
roadways, schools, and education resources, PBF recipients have been successful in gaining 
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better access to resources connected to program conditionalities. Never have PBF 
beneficiaries in Viçosa protested outright the difficulties they face in fulfilling program 
obligations, but after more than a decade of tactical engagements with municipal authorities – 
including subtle complaints, veiled threats, and indirect petitioning – they are starting to see 
infrastructural improvements. Their relationships with the state and CCTs are not exclusively 
one-way or always/already top-down: much like Gupta (2012) argues – e.g., that poor people 
in India find ways to apply pressure on state actors through the state’s own bureaucratic 
protocol – so too do CCT recipients make use of conditionalities in very nuanced ways to 
push back and demand better services.  
 Returning to broader debates over CCTs and their effects (Pereira, 2015; Rego and 
Pinzani, 2013), it could certainly be argued that Seu Pedro and others in rural Viçosa are 
finding ways to partake more fully in the rights and benefits of citizenship thanks to PBF. 
From a material standpoint, CCT recipients appear in many respects to have better access to 
citizenship rights today than in years past (e.g., Hall, 2013; Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014; Sany 
and Daudelin, 2013). But to say they have the same relationship to citizenship as working or 
middle class people (i.e., those who do not receive CCT assistance), or even those who live in 
large urban areas, would be unfair. Despite recognizing the obvious hypocrisy in state 
development discourses – of stressing individual responsibility, yet failing to fulfill a host of 
governance responsibilities – PBF beneficiaries in Viçosa are reticent to challenge state 
actors point blank on such contradictions. They are more tactical in their approach, 
recognizing and working around the unequal footing on which they stand. Instead of 
authoritatively harnessing discourses of citizenship and individual rights, they tend to make 
indirect complaints that hint at (rather than threaten) the consequences of continued state 
neglect. Such engagements with CCT conditionalities are more tactical than “insurgent” (see 
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Holston, 2008), “mak[ing] use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open” in order to 
poach opportunities of resistance (de Certeau, 1984, page 37). Crucial to poor people who 
can ill afford further marginalization, tactical measures enable CCT recipients safer and 
smarter modes of resistance: should they fail, there is less risk of retaliation from state actors.  
 As Secor explains, anonymity is also crucial to the ways tactics operate, allowing 
marginalized groups to work around state strategies. PBF recipients in northeast Brazil, like 
Kurdish migrants in Istanbul, rarely engage program conditionalities through acts of outright 
resistance, but instead by “‘making do’ […] in everyday life” (2004, page 353). These tactics 
also enable them to capture the attention of state actors, keeping the state on its toes, as it 
were, by hailing the state on issues it has difficulty ignoring (e.g., PBF revenues and federal 
development initiatives) (c.f., Gupta, 2012). In this way PBF beneficiaries are able to 
reposition their relationship with the state, stringing it along – just as it does to them – by 
making commitments that will never be completely fulfilled. Like the state, they shirk certain 
obligations, but tactically so, in ways that maintain their anonymity. This idea is more fully 
developed in the penultimate section, exploring the differences between 
anonymity/identification, tactics/strategies, and they ways PBF recipients engage beguilingly 
with the state, making and evading CCT commitments, just as the state does with them.   
5  Stringing along the state 
Fundamental to tactical engagements with CCTs are practices of sidestepping, 
eschewing, and dodging certain state obligations. In Viçosa, for example, CCT beneficiaries 
often took measures to avoid especially burdensome tasks required by PBF conditionalities. 
To be clear, never once did interview respondents argue that conditionalities were unfair, or 
that PBF benefits should come with no obligations. Rather, complaints focused on the 
unnecessary difficulties of fulfilling program obligations (e.g., waiting for hours each month 
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on long lines), and the ways conditionalities handcuffed and infantilized beneficiaries. 
Residents noted that municipal boundaries complicated their access to PBF benefits, meaning 
that instead of drawing on resources nearest to them (e.g., schools, health clinics, branches of 
the Federal Savings Bank), families might have to travel for hours to reach their officially 
designated municipal center. They also complained that spending their benefits was limited 
by where they could swipe their card, and that those stores were few in number and 
sometimes under stocked. While PBF administrators argue that such protocol is necessary to 
avoid program fraud and abuse, the effects on rural families can produce a host of new 
difficulties (see also Cookson, 2016).    
Speaking on the issue of PBF income requirements and how families risk losing the 
benefit if they earn extra income, one middle-aged man named Gustavo highlighted two key 
ways in which local families subvert state protocol:  
Most of the work people do around here isn’t for pay. It’s a favor you’re doing 
for someone, and then when you need it, he’ll help you out in return. Some 
people have extra jobs and they keep quiet about the money they earn because, 
well, if [municipal authorities] knew, they might make a cut to your benefit. 
But most of the work people do around here is for favors, or maybe you’ll get 
something in return, something you need, you see what I mean? It’s like an 
informal job, you understand? It’s rarely for money [laughing]. No one here 
has any money.  
 
Author: Has anyone with an extra job ever been caught and lost their benefit? 
Or, like, would someone around here ever denounce them? 
 
Gustavo: No, I don’t think so. That’s not how it works here in Brazil. People 
are always bending the rules [dando um jeito – see for example DaMatta, 
1984]. Look, worst are the officials, the politicians. They’re the most corrupt. 
So if there’s some guy here who’s got an extra job but his family still receives 
Bolsa Família, no way, that has nothing to do with me. At least he’s working. 
If I denounce him, his [PBF] money will go right into the pockets of officials. 
Seriously! 
 
In the first instance, the informal work described by Gustavo helps to illustrate how PBF 
recipients make do, supplementing their monthly benefits with other goods and services. 
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Rather than seeking formal employment, and thus potentially losing their PBF benefit, they 
engage in unpaid labor not captured by the state’s formal economic analyses. This tactic 
comes with a host of positive effects, not least in that it violates no laws or CCT obligations. 
And in the second instance, some recipients under report their monthly income so as not to 
disqualify their families from the program. Without the privilege of legal or financial advisors 
– often used when hiding money by the middle and upper classes – they must be more careful 
and calculated in their methods. In line with Pereira’s (2015) observation that PBF has by no 
means reduced labor productivity among beneficiaries, findings from Viçosa also confirm 
Hall’s (2013) suspicion that CCTs unintentionally stimulate informal labor practices. While 
CCTs may be intended to increase state influence, oversight, and governmentality (Hossain, 
2010) – including connecting poor people to formal employment (Garmany, 2016) – such 
outcomes are complicated by the ways recipient families negotiate program conditionalities. 
Simply put, people are working just as many hours today (if not more), but much of this work 
is informal or underreported due to the tactical ways poor people engage CCT 
conditionalities.   
 Related to this, PBF recipients also find ways to ease the burden of their 
conditionalities, particularly when it comes to travel distances and municipal boundaries. In 
cases where it might be easier for them to access resources in a neighboring municipality, 
rather than actually moving there, some residents simply report they have moved, register 
with authorities, and thereby establish domicile in the municipality where they want to access 
PBF benefits. Even though they continue to reside in their original municipality, ground 
truthing is rarely done, and thus poor people find ways to reduce the time and distance they 
must travel to fulfill program obligations.iii In similar fashion, recipient families also find 
ways to sidestep spending conditionalities imposed on them by PBF card-scanning 
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requirements: they spend their benefit on goods and at stores approved by PBF, and then 
trade those goods with others for the things they actually want. Like informal labor, this 
practice is appealing in that it is not illegal or likely to draw the attention of program officials. 
Most often in rural Viçosa, foodstuffs were traded for agricultural goods or other foodstuffs, 
making it nearly impossible to identify what had been bought with PBF benefits and what 
might have been produced locally. In this way local residents remain mostly anonymous in 
their evasion of program conditionalities, with few ways they could be identified or singled 
out for not following PBF protocol. Returning to Secor (2004), anonymity is fundamental to 
those on the margins and plays a central role in ways tactics are harnessed. By drawing on 
tactics like these, CCT recipients find ways to work around particularly difficult obligations 
imposed by program conditionalities, while at the same time reducing their exposure to being 
singled out or sanctioned.   
In many respects, tactics like these in rural Brazil are similar to strategies used by the 
state. Both work to string the other along, making commitments that invariably are not 
upheld, and in both instances blaming the other for systemic failures. Much like Secor (2007) 
notes in Istanbul, the relationship between the state and the working poor in Brazil is 
characterized by longing and despair – for state and non-state actors alike – where the 
promises and responsibilities that constitute the relationship are inevitably broken by both 
sides. Everyone seems to know they will be let down in the last instance. Development 
initiatives like CCTs are one of the state’s strategies for maintaining this relationship of 
infinite deferral, ‘assuring’ benefits to the poor provided they hold their end of the bargain. 
Yet the poor are by no means helpless, finding ways to tactically engage these programs so 
that they are not the only ones strung along.  
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So why, then, are the state’s practices strategic, and PBF recipients’ tactical? For 
example, why is it a strategy when state authorities abuse PBF money but not when poor 
people do, to reflect on Gustavo’s comment? It stems in the first instance from unequal power 
relations. According to de Certeau, strategies are linked to institutions that seek to dominate 
and engineer space (i.e., the state), whereas tactics are “clever tricks of the ‘weak’ within the 
order established of the ‘strong’” (1984, page 40). Going further, anonymity is also crucial 
for distinguishing the two (Lee, 2006; Secor, 2004). When poor people in Viçosa pressure 
state actors over difficulties they face in meeting PBF conditionalities, they do so indirectly, 
in ways that are non combative or might expose them to being singled out. They are much 
less likely to protest outwardly state or municipal policy – the same institutions that provide 
PBF benefits – preferring instead more cautious methods that are not obviously threatening. 
Much like James Scott observes (2009), this involves small, calculated interventions that 
make it difficult to assign responsibility or blame to a singular individual. Additionally, rather 
than openly chastising the state, their critique is indirect, “a calculated action determined by 
the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, 1984, pages 36-37). These practices are decidedly 
tactical, applying tacit pressure on the state by engaging development programs through 
governmentality discourses of responsibility, compliance, and pastoral oversight.     
In some cases individuals make themselves more clearly identifiable, like Seu Pedro 
with his repeated requests. Yet in this instance he plays the role of meek peasant farmer – not 
of angry, entitled citizen – tactically avoiding head on confrontations with state actors and 
long-established clientelist relationships. For state actors, these tactics of anonymity and ruse 
are less accessible, as they are always/already connected with political moments and 
discourse. Their relationships with non-state actors are meant to be pastoral, not horizontal 
(Garmany, 2014), and the state’s supposed objectivity inhibits diversity and unpredictability 
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so crucial to tactics. State strategies in development programs can of course appear 
ambiguous and opaque, but the state, as such, struggles to be anonymous in space or practice 
(see also Lefebvre, 2003; Secor, 2007). It is clearly identifiable, its representatives connected 
to specific discourses and their practices bound within certain registers. It is the burden of 
power, perhaps, that strips the state of the “maneuverable, polymorph mobilities” essential to 
tactics (de Certeu, 1984, page 40). Moreover, state actors themselves are easily singled out, 
less able to camouflage their practice. The signs, symbols, tropes, and indicators of the state 
are meant to erase multiplicity, working to establish a sense of cohesion and prominence. 
This in fact is intentional, a strategy in and of itself. Development initiatives are in every 
sense a contested terrain, and between CCT recipients and the state, the methods of 
engagement – the tactics and the strategies – are separate and unequal.   
 Exploring these differences helps in many ways to understand how CCTs are 
struggled over and, like Secor (2004) notes with respect to citizenship, the ways development 
initiatives are open to constant renegotiation. Program conditionalities offer new strategies 
for the state, as well as new tactics for recipients through prosaic and unanticipated openings. 
Such findings contribute to broader debates over the growth of rights-based discourses in the 
Global South (Hall, 2013; Lo Vuolo, 2013), and what the political effects of new income 
distribution policies might be (Ferguson, 2015; Seekings, 2012). Yet whether CCTs empower 
the citizenship rights of poor people is a different question altogether (Hunter and Sugiyama, 
2014; Pereira, 2015; Rego and Pinzani, 2013). Perhaps in urban areas – and/or from a macro, 
quantitative perspective, from where an overwhelming majority of this research is drawn 
(e.g., Sany and Daudelin, 2013; Lo Vuolo, 2013; Sugiyama, 2013) – CCTs help to produce 
stronger forms of citizenship. But as evidence from this case study in Viçosa shows, in rural 
contexts, where per capita numbers of CCT beneficiaries are much higher (Parsons, 2015), 
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the relationships between people and CCT programs are more nuanced. Rather than 
producing more empowered forms of citizenship, CCTs appear instead to offer recipients 
new points of entry for tactically engaging program conditionalities. Granted, these programs 
also provide the state additional governance strategies, but even the quid pro quo 
conditionalities of CCTs spark new tactical opportunities for program recipients. Through 
mutual practices of engagement and distancing, promising and blaming, fulfilling and 
shirking responsibility, and so on, CCTs appear not so much to empower the citizenships of 
poor people, but rather to intensify processes of constant renegotiation (c.f., Secor 2004) that 
characterize development initiatives in the first place.   
6  Conclusions 
 The last time I met Seu Pedro was in June 2014, near to the central market in Viçosa 
(the city). We bumped into each other by chance, exchanging pleasantries and commenting 
on the weather. It was raining hard that day. I teased him about the rain, saying I was 
surprised to see him given what he had told me about dirt roads in the region. He winked, and 
smiled, and winked again: “Man, I’ve lived here all my life. You think I worry about a 
rainstorm?” I laughed, saying he should watch out that day for municipal authorities. Still 
smiling he shook his head, saying he was not worried. The episode captured perfectly how 
development and governance operates in the region, as both state and non-state actors string 
one another along with half-truths and empty promises. PBF may be working to increase and 
intensify the relationships between poor people and the state, but whether this is producing 
stronger forms of citizenship is highly questionable. CCTs are a contested terrain, particularly 
in rural areas, and even state strategies aimed at inducing greater levels of governmentality 
are rearticulated through the tactics of recipient populations.    
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 This article has considered the ways CCT recipients engage program conditionalities, 
focusing specifically on rural contexts. While numerous studies debate the relationships 
between CCTs and citizenship (Hall, 2013; Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014; Pereira, 2015), this 
article follows Hickey’s warning that efforts to measure the citizenship effectiveness of 
development initiatives like CCTs risk re-producing a host of “Development” theory 
problems (2010, page 1149). Rather than examine CCT programs through the lens of 
citizenship, I have instead considered how PBF beneficiaries draw on tactical measures to 
negotiate program conditionalities. More specifically, I have argued that conditionalities are 
not fixed or immovable state strategies, but can instead be engaged tactically by PBF 
recipients to pressure the state and shirk particularly burdensome obligations (c.f., Gupta, 
2012). It thus appears that CCTs introduce even more tactical opportunities for program 
recipients – as well as strategic ones for the state – leaving relationships between poor people, 
development, and the state neither stronger nor weaker, but rather more unsettled and 
intensely renegotiated. Findings from this article contribute to existing debates regarding 
development and political governance (e.g., Hickey, 2010; Li, 2007; Meltzer, 2013), showing 
the diverse effects of initiatives like CCTs and the ways recipient populations sometimes 
harness these programs to pressure state actors for better services.  
 Still to be investigated are a host of issues related to CCTs, their relationships to 
governance, and important variations that distinguish urban and rural space. Though accounts 
of CCTs in the Global South are numerous (Ballard, 2013; Handa and Davis, 2006; 
Molyneux and Thomson, 2011), an overwhelming majority of this research comes from 
urban settings. As this study from rural northeast Brazil shows, there exist key differences 
between urban and rural areas in the ways people engage with development and the state. 
While the urban poor may be gaining better access to citizenship rights (Lo Vuolo, 2013; 
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Rego and Pinzani, 2013; Sugiyama, 2013), the rural poor confront different landscapes and 
thus cannot be lumped uncritically with their urban counterparts (e.g., Cookson, 2016). 
Understanding these differences, and accounting for the roles of CCTs and other 
development initiatives, remain important areas of study for researchers concerned with 





















Notes																																																								i	Unless otherwise noted, the data, quotes, and observations in this article come from 
interviews and fieldnotes recorded by the author while conducting field research.	ii	The names of those in this article have been changed to maintain confidentiality.	iii	Such practices are even encouraged in some instances by neighboring municipal authorities 
looking to poach new residents and, with them, new income revenues that result from PBF. 
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